Mind, Medicine, and Metaphysics:
Reflections on the Reclamation of the Human Spirit*

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Following the publication of such works as Auguste Comte's Cour de Philosophie Positive *(1830-1842), in which he argued the inherent immaturity of metaphysical discourse, metaphysics, for Western intellectuals—and especially for Western intellectuals committed to science—has largely been abandoned. In recent years, however, we have seen renewed interest in metaphysics among some researchers and clinicians, due, in part, to increasing attempts to integrate diverse fields of study into some unified and coherent understanding of human life. For many psychologists and psychiatrists, this renewed interest is accompanied by an implicit, and sometimes explicit, re-embrace of the notion of the "human spirit." In this paper we explore some of the processes animating this movement and some of the clinical implications that flow from it.*

INTRODUCTION

By *metaphysics* is meant that branch of philosophical inquiry that concerns itself with the unobservable dimensions of objective reality, and with fundamental ontological questions—such as the nature of the human person. Of all empirical researchers and clinicians, psychologists and psychiatrists may be particularly interested in metaphysics because much of the work that we do is concerned with "hypothetical constructs." Hypothetical constructs are entities or processes that are not available for direct sense inspection, but are invoked in order to explain phenomena that are observable. Intelligence, memory, attitudes, and love are all hypothetical constructs because they refer to entities or processes that cannot be perceived directly, but are known by the visible effects that they produce in the world. In this paper, we limit our concern to the conceptual construction of "mind" and to the implications of our way of understand-

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ing mind for the development of the discipline. Furthermore, as psychopathologists our discussion of mind will be focused on the unique way that this construct has developed among psychiatrists and clinicians.

In view of the foundational nature of metaphysics, it is fitting that we begin our exploration by revisiting the conditions out of which modern psychoanalytic psychiatry was born, and by reflecting upon the origins of current notions of what it means to be a person in need of psychotherapeutic assistance. These issues, we will suggest, hinge upon our concept of mind. Following this brief overview, we will suggest that a concept of mind that reembraces the notion of the "human spirit" appears to be on the horizon for those psychologists and psychiatrists that are interested in the application of the discipline to the resolution of human problems.

THE BIRTH OF MODERN PSYCHIATRY

In the 19th century, medicine—as a professional discipline—was just beginning to be consolidated. There were only three firmly established branches of medicine: internal medicine—which traces its roots back to Hippocrates; surgery—which had been practiced primarily by barbers; and neurology—which can be traced to the pioneering work of one of the founders of scientific method, René Descartes. Notwithstanding the work of Phillip Pinel, the 19th-century Parisian physician who is often credited with being the founder of modern psychiatry, psychiatry, as distinguished from neurology, could not have been born without a new, working-theory of mind; and it was, whatever our present attitude towards him might be, the Austrian physician, Sigmund Freud, who largely developed the conceptual basis for the theory of mind that has dominated psychiatry (and clinical psychology) for more than a century. Let us examine, then, how Freud's theory of mind was born.

The Concept of Functional Delta

One of the notions that was to appear early in medicine, and which was to pave the way for a scientific construction of the psyche, was the concept of *Functional Delta*. Functional Delta can be explained by noting the difference between a *symptom* in medicine, which is some kind of verbal or behavioral report of physical dysfunction or distress, and a *medical sign*, which is some pathophysiological evidence that stands in causal relation to the reported symptom and accounts for it. Under normal circumstances, there is a relationship between the severity of symptoms that are reported or evidenced by patients and the pathophysiological signs that are discovered upon physical examination. If patients are found that manifest a

variety of symptoms, but evidence no pathophysiological signs, the discrepancy between their reported symptoms (or illness-related behavior) and the observable signs is referred to as a *Functional Delta.*

During the 18th and 19th centuries it was believed that patients may manifest a high functional delta in two ways, and for two reasons: when pathophysiological signs were minimal or absent, but the intensity and range of symptoms and illness behaviors were high, patients were often accused of being malingerers who were playing the part of a sick person for some primary or secondary gain; conversely, when pathophysiological signs of disease were high but symptoms and illness behavior were absent or relatively low, patients were said to be, for whatever reason, unaware of the severity of their actual disease.

In the 1800s, however, medical science began to identify a particular configuration of symptoms—without corresponding pathophysiological signs—that could not be understood by invoking either unawareness or malingering as sufficient, logical explanations. This constellation of symptoms was known as *hysteria;* and while these symptoms had been observed in women for many centuries, they had not been understood as constituting a legitimate medical disorder. It was the meticulous observational and diagnostic work of Jean-Martin Charcot that led to the acceptance of hysteria as an authentic medical illness and that precipitated an intense clinical search for its natural cause.

Charcot carried out his work in Paris at Salpêtrière, which, by the end of the 19th century, had become a well-established asylum for the poorest of the Parisian proletariat (1). For more than two thousand years hysteria had been considered an incoherent, incomprehensible disease whose pathogenesis was explained by invoking a variety of mystical entities and processes—such as evil spirits and wandering uteri. During the 18th and 19th centuries, however, when medical science was becoming increasingly suspicious of mystical forces as adequate explanations for disease, neurologists began to search for the causes of hysteria, and all other diseases, in natural, observable processes.

The understanding of hysteria advanced greatly at Salpêtrière, due in large part to the meticulous clinical work of Charcot. Judith Herman has affirmed that Charcot's approach to hysteria "was that of a taxonomist. He emphasized careful observation, description, and classification. He documented the characteristic symptoms of hysteria exhaustively, not only in writing, but also with drawings and photographs"(1, p. 11). Because Charcot was one of the most entertaining lecturers of his time, every Tuesday afternoon, when he held his public lecture-demonstrations on

hysteria, many distinguished physicians would make the pilgrimage to behold the great master at work, among them two young neurologists; Pierre Janet and Sigmund Freud. As Janet, Freud, and a variety of fascinated male physicians looked on, Charcot and his interns performed the public grand-rounds examination that was intended to reveal the symptoms of a convulsive hysterical attack. After witnessing many of these examinations, Freud returned to Vienna and resumed his practice with a new mission.

For nearly a decade Pierre Janet, in France, and Sigmund Freud and his collaborator Joseph Breuer, in Vienna, were to search for the causes of hysteria. Their search, however, would be conducted in a manner wholly different from the usual way of proceeding in 19th-century medicine. Operating on little more than a hunch, Janet, Freud, and Breuer undertook their search by examining the stories that their patients told about their lives.

In listening to such stories, Janet, Freud, and Breuer came to affirm what Descartes had argued more than two centuries before but they argued it in a wholly new way. As had Descartes, Freud's description of the human reality suggested that it consists of two dimensions—a somatic dimension and a psychological one. Freud was the first in medicine to attempt an anatomy of the psyche—which he conceptualized as being the by-product of biological processes, inextricably linked to the body in functional ways, and thus wholly contingent upon the body for its functioning and existence. By rendering the psyche completely dependent upon biological processes, Freud's model provided a partial solution to the problem of Cartesian dualism. Furthermore, Freud's conceptualization would prove relatively acceptable to the leading European intellectuals of the time as it embodied a materialistic notion of the psyche that suggested that the body produces psychological phenomena. The rediscovery and redefinition of the psyche, as well as the adumbration of its role in human disease, was a significant milestone in the creation of modern psychiatry.

In 1896, Freud announced to the world the results of his study on hysteria in *The Aetiology of Hysteria.* He wrote:

> I therefore put forward the thesis that at the bottom of every case of hysteria there are one or more occurrences of premature sexual experience, occurrences which belong to the earliest years of childhood, but which can be reproduced through the work of psychoanalysis in spite of the intervening decades. I believe that this is an important finding, the discovery of a *caput Nili* in neuropathology. (2, p. 203)

Notwithstanding Freud's retreat only a year later,[1] the discovery of the etiology of hysteria (or what is widely viewed now as a constellation of disorders including Panic Disorder, Somatoform Disorder, Generalized Anxiety Disorder, Posttraumatic Stress Disorder, etc.) was revolutionary in that it contained the idea that human pathology may originate, not only from diseased tissue, organs, and pathophysiological processes, but from unhealthy ideas, experiences, and human relationships. It also established the psyche as distinct from, though related to, the brain as a legitimate object of empirical study and clinical concern. In these ways did Freud's work launch a century of study on the nature of the psyche and the impact of biological and social processes on its health and development.

THE ECLIPSE OF METAPHYSICS IN PSYCHOLOGY

In spite of these revolutionary contributions, Freud's somatopsychic conceptualization resulted in two significant problems for those who were committed to the possibility of human freedom. Inasmuch as he, and most of those who were to follow him, conceptualized the psyche as nothing more than the by-product of biological and social processes, Freud's bipartite theory rendered the human reality wholly and completely contingent. Thus, while proving successful in rescuing the study and treatment of mental illness from the superstitious ideas that had plagued it for centuries, Freud's theory also rendered human consciousness ontologically equivalent to all other phenomena in nature. In addition, in conceptualizing the psyche as an epiphenomenon of somatic processes, human consciousness was reduced to an effect, and was given little or no causal role in the calculus of human action. In brief, it could be said that modern psychiatry emerged in Europe through sacrifice of the unique powers generally associated with the human spirit.

Such a psychology must lead to an eclipse of that special type of hope that can be experienced only by human beings; for in the absence of a theory of mind that allows the possibility of transcending the influences of natural and social processes, an individual's present and future must be seen as an inevitable result of the past. In psychoanalytic theory, this hopelessness is captured succinctly in the story of *Oedipus*, which serves as

[1] Judith Herman observed that within a year of the publication of his work, Freud had reluctantly repudiated the traumatic theory of the origins of hysteria: "His correspondence makes clear that he was increasingly troubled by the radical social implications of this hypothesis. Hysteria was so common among women that if his patients' stories were true, and if his theory were correct, he would be forced to conclude that what he called 'perverted acts against children' were endemic, not only among the proletariat of Paris, where he had first studied hysteria, but also among the respectable bourgeois families of Vienna... .This idea was simply unacceptable. It was beyond credibility" (1, pp. 13-14).

Freud's root metaphor. In more recent times, this hopelessness is captured in the longstanding nature vs. nurture debate. *All human attributes*, affirm the sociobiologists, *must be explainable by invoking individual or collective biological heritage*; *no*, retort the environmentalists, *it is experience which best accounts for the acquisition of distinctly human characteristics*. The most sophisticated in this debate have come to affirm that human characteristics and behavior are best explained by invoking the *interplay* between nature and nurture.

Despite this enlightened concession, the idea of psychic determinism has continued to persist in psychology since the days of Freud. Adherents to the principles of psychic determinism, whether they be *soft* determinists (nurture-centered) or *hard* (nature-centered), affirm that human action can be explained using roughly the same causal principles that underlie the actions of other advanced mammals. In his hugely popular work, *An Elementary Textbook of Psychoanalysis*, Charles Brenner renders this point sufficiently clear:

> Let us start with the principle of psychic determinism. The sense of this principle is that in the mind, as in physical nature about us, nothing happens by chance, or in a random way. Each psychic event is determined by the ones which preceded it. . . .In fact, mental phenomena are no more capable of. . .a lack of causal connection with what preceded them than are physical ones. Discontinuity in this sense does not exist in mental life. (3, p. 2)

Commenting on this assumption, the noted psychiatrist and philosopher, Thomas Szasz observed:

> It is obvious. . .that not only psychoanalysts but also much of traditional and modern psychiatric theory assumes that personal conduct is determined by prior personal-historical events. All these theories downgrade and even negate explanations of human behavior in terms such as freedom, choice, and responsibility. (4, p. 5)

Karl Popper discussed this notion as the doctrine of *historicism,* which suggests that sociohistorical events are as fully determined by their antecedents as are physical events by theirs (5).

From a historicist perspective, metaphysical processes are irrelevant to psychology as they can have no meaning within a purely deterministic framework. Metaphysical processes are implicated only when we admit of the existence and operation of powers that can influence the trajectory suggested by the forces of nature and nurture, but that are not, in themselves, either reducible to, or wholly determined by, these forces.

Prior to the reconceptualization of the psyche, these metaphysical forces were assumed to find expression in the operation of the human spirit.

In his important work, *The Topology of Hope*, Calvin Schrag captures the unique dimensions of hoping that have been traditionally associated with the human spirit:

> We shall first speak of the praxis of hope. Praxis situates hope in the region of social formation and transformation. In this region the phenomenon of hope shows itself as a horizon of social consciousness, bearing implications for the wider cultural life of man. Understood within this modality, hope is the site from which the thought and action of interacting social selves transform the present in response to an envisioned condition of life in the future. (6, p. 269)

Schrag goes further to distinguish between hope and calculative social planning. In both cases, he observes, there is dissatisfaction with the present and an orientation toward the future.

> However, in the case of social planning, the orientation toward the future is in the mode of a calculation of empirical probabilities that can be manipulated within a simulated plan. In the phenomenon of hoping, the possibilities of the future remain incalculable from an empirico-experimental standpoint. Hope struggles against odds that appear overwhelming from the perspective of calculative thinking and technological control. Hope discloses an openness and transcendence of the future which imposes limits on calculation and prediction. (6, p. 271)

It is this transcendent dimension of hope that is a unique feature of human cognition.

In our view, no psychology that fails to tap the mysterious wellsprings of the human spirit can possibly satisfy the call for the creation of a "positive psychology" made by Martin Seligman and Mahaly Csikszentmihalyi in the January, 2000 special edition of the *American Psychologist*. In the introduction to this special edition, Seligman and Csikszentmihalyi wrote the following:

> Entering a new millennium, Americans face a historical choice. . . At this juncture, the social and behavioral sciences can play an enormously important role. They can articulate a vision of the good life that is empirically sound while being understandable and attractive. They can show what actions lead to well-being, to positive individuals and to thriving communities.
>
> Psychology should be able to help document what kinds of families result in children who flourish, what work settings support the greatest satisfaction among workers, what policies result in the strongest civic engagement, and how people's lives can be most worth living. . . .The aim of positive psychology

> is to begin to catalyze a change in the focus of psychology from preoccupation only with repairing the worst things in life to also building positive qualities.
>
> The field of positive psychology at the subjective level is about valued subjective experiences: well-being, contentment, and satisfaction (in the past); hope and optimism (for the future); and flow and happiness (in the present). At the individual level, it is about positive individual traits: the capacity for love and vocation, courage, interpersonal skill, aesthetic sensibility, perseverance, forgiveness, originality, future mindedness, spirituality, high talent, and wisdom. At the group level, it is about the civic virtues and the institutions that move individuals toward better citizenship: responsibility, nurturance, altruism, civility, moderation, tolerance, and work ethic. (7, p. 5)

The aspirations and goals expressed above make little sense within a purely deterministic framework. Indeed, whether wittingly or not, they suggest the need for a concept of mind that embodies a greater degree of freedom than is suggested by the present causal framework. Such a concept, we will suggest here, requires the notion of the human spirit.

By "human spirit" is meant two things: first, that capacity of consciousness that enables the human species, as distinct from all other known species, to consciously strive to attain that which is perceived to be true, beautiful, and good; and second, is meant that set of faculties, and/or processes that generate a psychological sense of "self," with hopes and aspirations that transcend the struggle for mere existence and continuity as a biological organism. For the remainder of this paper we would like to explore the conceptual underpinnings of the notion of the human spirit, and suggest some reasons why such a notion may be finding its way back into mainstream psychology.

Toward the Reclamation of the Human Spirit

A view of human nature that seeks to recover the human spirit —lost to the materialistic philosophies of the 18th, 19th, and 20th centuries—while also harmonizing with the rational and evidential demands required of modern empirical science, has begun to appear in the works of philosophers, researchers, and practitioners in various parts of the world (see for example, Nussbaum, Wilbur, Schwartz, Danesh and Hatcher, 8-12).

The integrative approach suggested in many (though not all) of the works of these scholars insists upon monism, as opposed to dualism, and affirms an essential complementarity between the knowledge uncovered by science and many of the fundamental insights into reality provided by the premodern perennial philosophers. From this perspective, human beings are said to belong both to the impermanent and contingent world of nature, as well as to a transcendent dimension of existence made possible

by the unique powers associated with human speech and consciousness. These powers are encompassed in the notion of the human spirit. In our view, if we are to affirm the possibility of human freedom (and we appear to be affirming this in the very structure of Western civilization), we cannot do so without a concept of mind that includes the notion of spirit. What, then, might such a notion consist of?

The Concept and Role of Spirit in a Theory of Mind

Aristotle, whose perspective is embraced here, took an essentialist approach to the question of existence, and held that if you want to know the true identity of a thing, you must know its four causes.[2] These causes include the material, formal, efficient, and final cause. Material cause is existence itself. It is that passive, undifferentiated matter that makes possible all other causes—it is the "stuff" of existence without form or function. Aristotle held that inasmuch as something cannot be brought forth from nothing, to "create" simply means to add formal cause (or structure) and final cause (or destiny and purpose) to material cause. That cause which transforms unformed matter into "something" is thus the efficient cause for that thing's existence. All processes of creation, suggested Aristotle, operate according to this same principle.

For example, an artist creates a sculpture by adding his or her conscious vision of form to unformed clay. In this case, the sculptor's hands and consciousness become the organizing energies that are the proximal sufficient cause for the sculpture's coming-into-being. And although the clay certainly had existence prior to the work of the sculptor, it did not have existence as art. Existence is thus relative, rather than absolute, and depends upon the attributes and capacities of the entities under consideration.

For example, persons exist, and so also do stones, but there are significant differences between the existence of a person and that of a stone. Though a stone exists, compared to the existence of a person, it is nonexistent (13, p. 241). Thus do we say of a person who has passed from the human kingdom to that of the mineral that he or she has died. Of course, inasmuch as everything in existence is made of fundamentally the same matter, the capacities of an entity are determined, not by the

[2] Essentialism has, of course, been the object of considerable criticism by postmodern thinkers. Nevertheless, it is possible to accept the ontological unity of the human race as a species without rejecting or denying the specific manner in which human identity is expressed owing to gender, race, class, culture, and historical processes. This is the perspective that informs our embrace of essentialism.

substance, but by the energy, information or consciousness responsible for an entity's organization and functioning.

A modern version of Aristotle's perspective is captured in the Second Law of Thermodynamics, or Carnot's principle. This principle requires that if matter is to have form and order, it must be organized by some force or energy. (According to Carnot's principle, order is improbable while disorder is probable. As Hatcher (14) notes, this is the case because order represents a limited number of stable configurations (e.g., a brick house), whereas any possible configuration represents disorder (e.g., a pile of bricks)). This organizing force may take the form of pure energy, information, and/or consciousness. Manifested in one of its simplest forms (e.g., electromagnetic energy, the strong nuclear force, and/or gravity) this organizing energy is the cohesive force that results in the capacities apparent in the mineral kingdom. In the plant kingdom, this same force manifests itself in the capacity for both cohesion and growth; and in the animal kingdom, this force is manifested in the power of cohesion, growth, plus sense perception and cognition. Last, in the human person, this force is manifested as the power of cohesion, growth, sense perception, cognition, and the unique qualities of consciousness required for meta-cognition—or the consciousness of consciousness.

Let us note that at each level of ontology, moving from the mineral to the human kingdom, there is a corresponding increase in freedom. Relative to the plant, which has, for example, the capacity to re-orient its leaves and roots in order to take advantage of the light and water resources available in the environment, the mineral is relatively bound by its immediate circumstances. Similarly, as we move from the plant kingdom to that of the animal, we observe another significant leap in the degree of freedom. The powers of mobility and sense perception which are characteristic of the animal kingdom permit animals to deliberately interact with their environment, to explore and adapt to a wider range of the ecological context; and, with awareness, to form relational bonds with other beings.

In the human kingdom, it is the power of consciousness that gives the human person the potential for development along unique lines. This special type of consciousness is referred to in contemporary psychology as the power of meta-cognition. Meta-cognitive powers enable us to know, not only the nonmaterial aspects of ourselves (such as our values, beliefs, attitudes, and so forth), but to have objective knowledge of metaphysical principles, laws and processes—such as the abstract laws that govern the universe, the principles and qualities that are associated with assessments

of beauty, and the underlying logic of systems of governance, ethics and value.

Here we refer to this organizing force as "spirit" because the concept of spirit enables us to capture the multidimensional nature of this organizing energy across different levels of ontology, or different qualities of existence. We may, therefore, speak of the qualities of existence that characterize the mineral, plant, animal, and human kingdoms as being due to the presence of different qualities (or manifestations) of a single, unitary force responsible for existence. The suggestion of such a force need not require the invocation of dualism, as it has already been established that matter and energy are interchangeable expressions of the same reality.

Viewed from the foregoing perspective, as the most evolved, complex, and refined entity in nature, the human brain and body naturally provide for the manifestation of spirit in its highest form. This highest form is the appearance in nature of the phenomenon of "self." The self is that transcendent dimension of existence that confers upon humans a degree of freedom and responsibility found nowhere else in nature. In contrast, therefore, to the existing nature-nurture, bipartite conceptualization, the competing ontology referenced here affirms that three processes interact to shape human character: 1. natural processes, which include biological and genetic forces; 2. social processes, which include educational and cultural forces; and 3. processes of the *self*, which are unique to the "human spirit."

In the life of the individual, when the powers of the self and the animating forces of the human spirit are eclipsed by an unhealthy body, unhealthy ideas, relationships or other impediments, the processes of personal development may also suffer. Freud's discovery of the etiology of hysteria, which precipitated the emergence of modern psychoanalytic psychiatry, can thus be viewed as a discovery of the impact of oppression, injustice, and immorality on the human spirit and the developing self. His patients were not, as he himself clearly established, suffering principally from biological disorders; rather, they were grappling with assaults to the psyche, or "spirit injuries"(15) brought on by sexual exploitation and violence. Of course, inasmuch as matter and spirit (or body and mind) constitute an indivisible whole, injuries to the human spirit will naturally have somatic consequences, and vice-versa.

The Healthy Development of the Human Spirit

The human spirit, self, or consciousness, develops gradually over the life of the individual. At early stages of human development, the powers of the human spirit—which include the power to know, to love and to will—are

manifested in ways that are indistinguishable from the qualities of mind that characterize other species.

In infancy, for example, the power of knowledge tends to be limited to "instinctual awareness." Furthermore, classical conditioning—wherein the organism responds unconsciously and reflexively to environmental stimuli—tends to be the primary mode of learning. The power of will at this early stage is characterized by automatism, and love is manifested in the instinctual form of "bonding." As infancy gives way to childhood, an individual's native intelligence begins to manifest itself and is applied to the exploration of the world and the acquisition of sensory-motor skills. Reactions, mediated by a maturing will, tend to be emotion based; and bodily desires—centered in the pursuit of pleasure and the avoidance of pain—provide the primary incentives for action. Love, at this stage of development, is under stimulus control, and is understood as that which provides sensual gratification. It is clear that Freud's psychobiological model is essentially a model of the human person in infancy and childhood.

In early adolescence, the powers of consciousness expand, and healthy individuals begin to manifest metacognitive abilities that permit reflection on the abstract dimensions of existence. During this stage of development, the capacities that distinguish humans from other forms of life begin to become more pronounced. The power to know, for instance, transcends knowledge of the material world and begins to encompass systems of thought and of value. The power of will is manifested as the power to decide —based on consideration of an array of options; and love moves from a largely sensual and emotion-based phenomena to one that is more conscious and reflective.

If an individual's horizons broaden further, he or she can begin to acquire a type of knowledge that is referred to by Danesh (11), and others, as "enlightened awareness" or wisdom (16). At this stage, consciousness is illumined by universal ethical principles, and the power of will yields in service to others. Love, too, becomes enlightened by a genuine concern for the well-being and happiness of others, and the capacity for self-sacrifice becomes increasingly manifest. It is this expansion of human consciousness, reflected ultimately in human behavior, that is described by the Persian philosopher, 'Abdu'l-Bahá:

> Every imperfect soul is self-centered and think(s) only of his own good. But as his thoughts expand a little he will begin to think of the welfare and comfort of his family. If his ideas still more widen, his concern will be the felicity of his fellow citizens; and if still they widen, he will be thinking of the glory of his land and of his race. But when ideas and views reach the utmost degree of

> expansion and attain the stage of perfection, then will he be interested in the exaltation of humankind. He will then be the well-wisher of all men and the seeker of the weal and prosperity of all lands. This is indicative of perfection. (17, p. 69)

As individuals advance through each stage of development, the qualities and capacities acquired at earlier stages are not lost; nor are they to be viewed as anything less than essential in the developmental process. The mature and healthy person has not learned to deny or repress his or her bodily or psychological needs, but has learned to satisfy those needs in a manner commensurate with a set of ethical principles that take into consideration human dignity and interdependence. By contrast, those who fail to develop in these ways—for reasons of either nature, nurture or the conscious misuse of knowledge, love and will—may well become slaves to their passions, limited in their ability to manifest the full spectrum of human qualities, and/or thwarted in their efforts toward actualization of the powers and capacities inherent in the self. Such individuals may be in need of medical treatment, the aid of a psychotherapist, or basic assistance in processes known to be effective in facilitating human development. A psychology that embraces the human spirit, while remaining committed to the rational and empirical demands of modern science, possesses the capacity to address the needs of individuals along all these dimensions of human life. It is for this reason that the concept of the human spirit, in all of its richness, may be finding its way back into mainstream psychology.

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